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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1977, the Supreme Court held in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois
1
 that indirect purchasers 
were barred from bringing private antitrust actions under Section 4 of the Clayton Act.
2
 
Embracing a functional reading of § 4, the Court sought to promote deterrence of antitrust 
violators and efficient enforcement of antitrust laws.
3
  The best scheme for vigorous private 
antitrust enforcement, the Court reasoned, was to incentivize the best antitrust enforcers—direct 
purchasers.
4
  Yet, where direct purchasers are not the most vigorous antitrust enforcers, courts 
have recognized that exceptions to Illinois Brick are essential to proper enforcement of the 
antitrust laws.
5
  In particular, the coconspirator exception has become an important limitation on 
the direct purchaser rule by granting indirect purchasers standing where an upstream producer 
and a direct purchaser have entered into a vertical conspiracy aimed at injuring indirect 
purchasers.
6
   
Taking a formalistic approach to Illinois Brick, however, the Ninth Circuit and the Fourth 
Circuit have restricted the scope of the coconspirator exception to cases in which a vertical 
conspiracy has fixed the “price paid” by indirect purchasers.7  These cases stand in opposition to 
the “first nonconspirator” rule, a functional approach to antitrust standing supported by the Third 
Circuit and Seventh Circuit that grants the first purchaser from outside a vertical conspiracy 
standing, even where the price has been fixed upstream.
8
  This Comment argues that the circuit 
split should be resolved in favor of the “first nonconspirator” rule, which encourages vigorous 
                                                          
1
  Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). 
2
  Id. at 736. 
3
  See infra Part II.B. 
4
  See Id. 
5
  See infra Part II.C. 
6
  See infra notes 69–71.  
7
  See infra Part III.A. 
8
  See infra Part III.B. 
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antitrust enforcement, as opposed to the “price paid” rule, which gives would-be antitrust 
violators a roadmap to antitrust immunity.
9
  Part II of this Comment traces the evolution of the 
direct purchaser rule and the Supreme Court’s push for a functional approach to antitrust 
standing.  Part III reviews the underpinnings of the “price paid” rule in the Ninth Circuit and 
Fourth Circuits, and discusses the development of the “first nonconspirator” rule in the Third 
Circuit and the Seventh Circuit.  Part IV analyzes the “price paid” rule and its stated 
justifications in light of economic commentary and Supreme Court precedent, and highlights the 
efficacy of the “first nonconspirator” rule.  This Comment concludes with a summary of the 
conflicting applications of the coconspirator exception and stresses the importance of a 
functional approach to antitrust standing that promotes efficient enforcement of the antitrust 
laws. 
II. Background of the Direct Purchaser Rule and the Goals of Illinois Brick 
A. Private Antitrust Enforcement: Compensation and Deterrence 
 Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides a private cause of action to “any person” who has 
been injured by an antitrust law violation.
10
  Importantly, § 4 is an expansive grant of power to 
“private attorneys general,”11 containing “little in the way of restrictive language.”12 Courts have 
interpreted this broad language as a reflection of Congress’s intent to promote two goals:  
                                                          
9
  See infra Part IV. 
10
  Section 4 provides, in relevant part, that “[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason 
of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United States in the district in 
which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall 
recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.”  15 
U.S.C.A. § 15. 
11
  Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972). 
12
  Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 472 (1982) (quoting Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 
337 (1979)). 
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deterrence of violators and compensation of victims.
13
  While Congress also created a public 
enforcement scheme for antitrust laws,
14
 such enforcement has traditionally been limited to 
penalties and forward-looking conduct remedies
15—tools that, alone, insufficiently deter antitrust 
violations.
16
  It therefore comes as no surprise that private plaintiffs have brought as much as 
95% of antitrust cases in some years.
17
 
Despite § 4’s apparent simplicity, the section has raised complex questions concerning 
the scope of permissible plaintiffs.
18
  Were courts to interpret the statute literally (i.e. “any 
person”), § 4 would arguably generate inefficient use of societal resources.19  Antitrust violations 
often create a rippling effect, resulting in market injury to remote victims.
20
  While granting 
remote victims a cause of action would promote the goal of compensation, such lawsuits would 
                                                          
13
  See Blue Shield, 457 U.S. at 472 (Section 4’s “lack of restrictive language reflects Congress’ ‘expansive remedial 
purpose’ in enacting § 4:  Congress sought to create a private enforcement mechanism that would deter violators and 
deprive them of the fruits of their illegal actions, and would provide ample compensation to the victims of antitrust 
violations.);  But see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS 
PRACTICE 654 (4th ed. 2011) (“Unfortunately, courts have never been able to create an intelligible theory of private 
antitrust standing capable of being applied across a full range of potential cases.  The law remains haphazard and 
inconsistent.  One reason is that neither Congress nor the courts has articulated a rationale for private 
enforcement.”). 
14
  See 15 U.S.C. § 1–2 (2006) (setting criminal penalties for illegal restraints of trade and monopolization); 
Hovenkamp, supra note 13 at 643 ( “The public enforcement of the federal antitrust laws is largely in the hands of 
the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice . . . and the Federal Trade Commission . . . .”). 
15
  See Hovenkamp, supra note 13 at 645 (“Most civil antitrust investigations leading to challenges result in consent 
decrees, which are binding out-of-court settlements approved by the court . . . . Remedies for civil violations of the 
antitrust laws can include injunctions, as well as dissolution or divestiture for illegal mergers or occasionally 
monopolization.”). 
16
  Stephen Calkins, Civil Monetary Remedies Available to Federal Antitrust Enforcers, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 567, 569 
(2006) (Describing how the majority of federal antitrust enforcement actions result in nothing more than injunctions, 
leading to “insufficient deterrence and . . . worrisome incentives.”); Joseph P. Bauer, The Stealth Assault on 
Antitrust Enforcement: Raising the Barriers for Antitrust Injury and Standing, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 437, 438 (2001) 
(“Governmental resources are inherently limited, and those scare resources can be devoted to other tasks if private 
parties also police unlawful conduct.”). 
17
  See Hovenkamp, supra note 13at 652. 
18
  Id.  
19
  See Id. at 653. 
20
  Id. at 653 (“For example, monopolization of a raw material can cause reduced demand for products made of that 
material.  Suppliers of machinery for making those products may also face reduced demand, and some employees 
may lose their jobs.  If bankruptcies result, creditors may not be paid, leases may be prematurely terminated, and 
taxes may go uncollected.”). 
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be costly to litigate and would generate only questionable gains in deterrence.
21
  Moreover, total 
litigation would increase as remote victims outnumber direct victims.
22
  And, even where the 
injury is minor, the promise of treble-damages would lure remote victims into the courtroom.
23
  
The Supreme Court feared that this broad reading of § 4 would crowd out the plaintiffs best 
situated to enforce antitrust laws and properly deter violators—direct purchasers.24  Sacrificing 
compensation for deterrence, Courts adopted limitations on § 4 standing,
25
  including the 
“antitrust injury” doctrine26  and the Illinois Brick direct purchaser rule.27   
Recently, courts have become increasingly hostile to private plaintiffs, expanding these 
limitations and erecting “ever-higher hurdles to private actions.”28  In particular, recent evolution 
of the direct purchaser rule has eschewed functionalism for formalism,
29
 ignoring “the policies 
that animated the establishment of the rule.”30  The “price paid” rule is emblematic of this recent 
trend.  Derived from a rigid reading of Illinois Brick, the “price paid” rule limits the widely 
embraced coconspirator exception
31
 to cases in which a vertical conspiracy has fixed the “price 
                                                          
21
  Id. (“Private enforcement is subject to the law of diminishing returns—the more there is, the less deterrence will 
be obtained per enforcement dollar . . . . The amount of increased efficiency in the form of deterrence of price fixing 
could be very low in proportion to the increased costs of litigation.”). 
22
  Id. 
23
  Id. at 652; “The Clayton Act’s provision of mandatory treble damages plus attorney’s fees to prevailing plaintiffs 
has put extraordinary pressure on courts to develop intelligible limits on antitrust enforcement rights.  These 
statutory provisions encourage litigation by people for whom the amount of recovery discounted by the probability 
of success would otherwise be marginal.”  Id. at 653–654. 
24
  See infra Part II.B. 
25
  Id. at 16; Bauer, supra note 16 at 443 (“These doctrines, and many of the cases interpreting them, are grounded 
on sound public policy, of placing prudential limits both on the number of private antitrust claims and the persons 
who may bring them.”). 
26
  See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 497. 
27
  Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977). 
28
  Bauer, supra note 16 at 438. 
29
 See Barak D. Richman & Christopher R. Murray, Rebuilding Illinois Brick: A Functionalist Approach to the 
Indirect Purchaser Rule, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 69, 81 (2007) (“The unqualified nature of the current indirect purchaser 
rule places it at odds with the general body of current antitrust law. Modern antitrust . . . eschews inflexible formalist 
rulings that rest on categorical distinctions and instead favors a functionalist approach designed to maximize social 
welfare.”). 
30
  Id. at 447. 
31
  See infra notes 69–71. 
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paid” by the indirect purchaser.32  By denying the best antitrust enforcer—the first indirect 
purchaser—standing, the rule weakens private antitrust enforcement by undermining deterrence 
and efficiency
33—the very objectives that animated Illinois Brick in the first place.34  The result 
is that both of § 4’s goals are sacrificed:  victims go uncompensated and violators go undeterred. 
B. The Direct Purchaser Rule: Encouraging Deterrence and Efficiency Through the Best 
Antitrust Enforcer 
 
By restricting output, a cartel is able to extract supra-competitive (above-market) prices 
when selling to a direct purchaser. The direct purchaser—who has suffered the initial 
“overcharge”—is often an intermediary in the chain of distribution, and as result, will often raise 
its own prices in response, causing some portion of the overcharge to be “passed-on” to the “next 
person in the distribution chain, who will do the same thing in turn until the good reaches the 
final consumer.”35  The extent of the pass-on at each link in the distribution chain will vary 
depending on the level of competition in the market, the characteristics of the seller’s operations, 
and the degree to which the seller’s price increase results in a reduction in its volume of sales.36 
The final consumer and each entity down the chain that absorbed a part of the overcharge (all of 
whom have been injured as a consequence of an antitrust violation) would appear to have a valid 
cause of action based on the plain language of § 4.  
 The Supreme Court, however, has stressed that such a literal reading of the Clayton Act 
is impractical because it would result in duplicative recoveries, complex apportionment of 
                                                          
32
  See infra Part III.A. 
33
  See infra Part IV.A. 
34
  See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 745–746 (1977); infra II.B. 
35
  Herbert Hovenkamp, The Indirect-Purchaser Rule and Cost-Plus Sales, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1717, 1717 (1990); 
see also Robert G. Harris & Lawrence Sullivan, Passing on the Monopoly Overcharge: A Comprehensive Policy 
Analysis, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 269, 346–47  (1979) (“Theoretical economics and practical information about pricing 
practices suggest that even in the short run massive passing on is the rule and that in the long run it is well nigh 
inevitable.”). 
36
  AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, INDIRECT PURCHASER LITIGATION HANDBOOK, 132 
(2007). 
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damages along the distribution chain, and reduced incentives for the best antitrust enforcers.
37
  
Consequently, the Supreme Court has limited § 4 by creating the direct purchaser rule, which has 
two major components: 1) it awards direct purchasers the entire overcharge, even if they passed-
on the cost to indirect purchasers;
38
 and 2) it denies indirect purchasers standing, even if they 
incurred part, or all, of the overcharge.
39
 The Court posited that the rule would improve 
deterrence and produce a more efficient scheme of private antitrust enforcement.
40
   
The origin of the direct purchaser rule is found in Hanover Shoe, Inc v. United Shoe 
Machinery Corp.  Hanover, a shoe manufacturer, alleged that United Shoe, a shoe machine 
manufacturer, had illegally monopolized the market for shoe machinery.
41
  United Shoe claimed 
that Hanover had not been injured under § 4, arguing that any overcharge paid by Hanover had 
been passed-on to downstream consumers.
42
  The Supreme Court rejected the pass-on defense 
for two primary reasons.  First, the Court asserted that the complex task of calculating the pass-
through, which entails distinguishing between the effect of the overcharge and the effect of 
market forces, would “normally prove insurmountable.”43  Second, making the pass-on defense 
available to violators would undermine deterrence because the final consumers in the distribution 
                                                          
37
  Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 720, 730, 736, 737, 745–746. 
38
  Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 489 (1968). 
39
  Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 736. 
40
  Id. at 745–746. 
41
  Hanover, 392 U.S. at 483. 
42
  Id. at 491–492. 
43
  Id. at 492–493; The Court detailed the difficulties in calculating the pass-through rate:  “Normally the impact of a 
single change in the relevant conditions cannot be measured after the fact; indeed a businessman may be unable to 
state whether, had one fact been different (a single supply less expensive, general economic conditions more 
buoyant, or the labor market tighter, for example), he would have chosen a different price. Equally difficult to 
determine, in the real economic world rather than an economist's hypothetical model, is what effect a change in a 
company's price will have on its total sales. Finally, costs per unit for a different volume of total sales are hard to 
estimate. Even if it could be shown that the buyer raised his price in response to, and in the amount of, the 
overcharge and that his margin of profit and total sales had not thereafter declined, there would remain the nearly 
insuperable difficulty of demonstrating that the particular plaintiff could not or would not have raised his prices 
absent the overcharge or maintained the higher price had the overcharge been discontinued.”  Id.  
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chain “would have only a tiny stake in a lawsuit and little interest in attempting a class action.”44  
By reducing the incentive of direct purchasers to bring suit, violators would “retain the fruits of 
their illegality . . . .”45  In sum, the decision granted direct purchasers a windfall: even where they 
had not absorbed any of the injury, direct purchasers could pursue treble-damages. The Court 
declined to read § 4 literally and instead adopted a functional approach to antitrust standing that 
encouraged deterrence and efficiency by rewarding direct purchaser enforcement. 
 Nine years later, the Court considered the viability of offensive pass-on arguments in 
Illinois Brick v. Illinois.
46
  Plaintiffs, indirect purchasers, alleged that the defendant 
manufacturers had conspired to inflate concrete block prices.
47
  Plaintiffs asserted standing under 
§ 4, arguing that the illegal overcharge had been passed-on to them (by innocent intermediaries) 
through two levels of the distribution chain.
48
  Creating symmetry with its decision in Hanover, 
the Court declined to apply different standards to defensive pass-on and offensive pass-on.
49
  
First, the Court reasoned that “unequal application of the Hanover Shoe rule” would result in 
duplicative liability for defendants.
50
  Second, the task of calculating pass-on rates would be even 
more complex in the offensive context:  “the evidentiary complexities and uncertainties involved 
in the defensive use of pass-on against a direct purchaser are multiplied in the offensive use of 
pass-on by a plaintiff several steps removed from the defendant in the chain of distribution.”51  
                                                          
44
  Id. at 494. 
45
  Id.  
46
  Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). 
47
  Id. at 726. 
48
  Id. at 727. 
49
  Id. at 731. 
50
  Id. at 731; Duplicative liability would result, the Court explained, as follows: “Even though an indirect purchaser 
had already recovered for all or part of the overcharge passed on to it, the direct purchaser would still recover 
automatically the full amount of the overcharge that the indirect purchaser had shown to be passed on; similarly, 
following an automatic recovery of the full overcharge by the direct purchaser the indirect purchaser could sue to 
recover the same amount.”  Id. 
51
  Id. at 732. 
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The Court reasoned that offensive use of a pass-on theory would require complex calculations at 
every link in the distribution chain.
52
 
 After rejecting unequal treatment of offensive pass-on and defensive pass-on, the Court 
was left with two options: either overrule Hanover Shoe or deny indirect purchasers standing.
53
  
The Court chose the latter option for two reasons: 1) the “use of pass-on theories under § 4 
essentially would transform treble-damages actions into massive efforts to apportion the 
recovery among all potential plaintiffs that could have absorbed part of the overcharge from 
direct purchasers to middlemen to ultimate consumers;”54 and 2) pass-through calculations 
would require courts to analyze elasticities along with the “difficulties and uncertainties” of 
determining the path of market forces but-for the overcharge.
55
  The Court further declined to 
permit market-based exceptions to Hanover Shoe, as it would generate battles over line drawing 
in particular markets, ensnaring the courts in the same complex market analysis that Hanover 
Shoe had sought to avoid.
56
  Finally, the court considered the impact that apportionment, adorned 
with complex pass-through calculations at every link in the chain, would have on the efficiency 
of antitrust enforcement.
57
  Complex apportionment, the court posited, would increase the costs 
of recovery and diffuse the recovery among a large group of plaintiffs.
58
   
The sum result was that direct purchasers, the most vigorous private enforcers of antitrust 
laws, would have drastically reduced incentives to bring suit.
59
  The Court therefore barred 
indirect purchasers from asserting pass-on claims, reasoning that direct purchasers were the most 
                                                          
52
  Id. at 732–733. 
53
  Id. at 736. 
54
  Id. at 737.  The Court further asserted that there would be a “strong possibility that indirect purchasers remote 
from the defendant would be parties to virtually every treble-damages action . . . .”  Id. at 742. 
55
  Id. at 743. 
56
  Id. at 745. 
57
  Id.  
58
  Id. 
59
  Id. 
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effective “private attorneys general.”60  Awarding direct purchasers the full overcharge, the 
Court concluded, would best promote the “longstanding policy of encouraging vigorous private 
enforcement of the antitrust laws . . . .”61  As in Hanover, the court in Illinois Brick embraced a 
functional approach to antitrust standing:  working around the literal reading of § 4, the Court 
adopted a rule to promote optimal antitrust enforcement through efficiency and deterrence.  The 
best way to accomplish these goals was to adopt policies that encouraged the best antitrust 
enforcers to bring suit. 
C. Exceptions to Illinois Brick 
Several exceptions to Illinois Brick have developed in recognition that rigid adherence to 
the direct purchaser rule can weaken antitrust enforcement.  Exceptions may be warranted where 
the baseline assumption in Illinois Brick—that direct purchasers are the best antitrust enforcers—
does not hold.
62
  First, the “cost-plus” exception, expressly recognized by Hanover Shoe and 
Illinois Brick, applies where an indirect purchaser enters into a contract with a direct purchaser 
for a fixed quantity and a fixed markup.
63
  Because the overcharge is passed entirely to indirect 
purchasers, there is no need for complex pass-through calculations.
64
  Most importantly, the 
direct purchaser has suffered no injury, and therefore lacks incentive to bring suit under § 4.
65
  
Second, under the “control” exception, indirect purchasers have standing where the defendant 
                                                          
60
  Id. at 746 (quoting Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972)). 
61
  Id. at 745 (citing Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int’l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968)). 
62
  See California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93 (1989) (“In Illinois Brick, the Court was concerned not merely 
that direct purchasers have sufficient incentive to bring suit under the antitrust laws . . . but rather that at least some 
party have sufficient incentive to bring suit.”); In re Mid-A. Toyota Antitrust Litig., 516 F. Supp. 1287, 1294 (D. 
Md. 1981) (“Illinois Brick does admit of exceptions beyond those expressly recognized in the text, in circumstances 
where application of the rule would further neither of the policy objectives underlying the doctrine itself.”). 
63
  Id. at 737. 
64
  Id.  
65
  See Hovenkamp, supra note 13 at 677. 
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upstream producer owns or controls the direct purchaser.
66
  Because there is virtually no chance 
that the direct purchaser will bring suit,
67
 the first-level indirect purchaser becomes the best, most 
vigorous antitrust enforcer.
68
 
Finally, courts have widely approved a third exception, the “coconspirator exception,” 
which applies where an upstream producer and a direct purchaser have entered into a vertical 
conspiracy aimed at extracting monopoly profit from indirect purchasers.
69
  Under the traditional 
coconspirator exception, where the vertical conspiracy directly sets retail prices, courts are able 
to avoid pass-through calculations, as damages equal the difference between the retail price and 
the but-for price.
70
  Because the direct purchaser is an antitrust violator and lacks incentive to 
sue, purchasers from outside the conspiracy must move to the forefront of private antitrust 
enforcement.
71
  Duplicative recovery concerns may still remain where a conspiring intermediary 
defects from the conspiracy and brings its own cause of action against its suppliers.
72
  As such, 
case law often requires plaintiff indirect purchasers to name the conspiring intermediaries as 
                                                          
66
  Royal Printing Co. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 621 F.2d 323, 326 (9th Cir. 1980); Mid-West Paper Prods. Co. v. 
Cont'l Grp., Inc., 596 F.2d 573, 578 n.8 (3d Cir. 1979); Jewish Hosp. Ass'n of Louisville, Ky., Inc. v. Stewart Mech. 
Enters., Inc., 628 F.2d 971, 974 (6th Cir. 1980); Toyota, 516 F. Supp. at 1292. 
67
  Royal Printing, 621 F.2d at 326. 
68
  See id. 
69
  See Lowell v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 177 F.3d 1228, 1231 (11th Cir. 1999); Paper Sys. Inc. v. Nippon Paper Induss. 
Co., Ltd., 281 F.3d 629, 631 (7th Cir. 2002); State of Ariz. v. Shamrock Foods Co., 729 F.2d 1208, 1211 (9th Cir. 
1984); Fontana Aviation, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 617 F.2d 478, 480 (7th Cir. 1980); Toyota, 516 F. Supp. 
at1293; Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 486 F. Supp. 115, 118 (D. Minn. 1980); Gas-A-Tron of Arizona v. Am. Oil Co., 
No. CIV 73-191-TUC-WCF, 1977 WL 1519 at *2, *3 (D. Ariz. Dec. 7, 1977). 
70
   Shamrock 729 F.2d at 1214; Toyota, 516 F. Supp. at 1292–93, 1295 (“Where market forces have been 
suspended, tracing problems disappear; the whole of the overcharge can be said to have ‘passed through’ to the 
ultimate consumer.”). 
71
  See Howard Hess Dental Labs. Inc. v. Dentsply Int’l., Inc., 424 F.3d 363, 381 (3d Cir. 2005). 
72
  In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., MDL Dkt. No. 248, 600 F.2d 1148, 1163 (5th Cir. 1979).  The court explained 
that absent joinder of the conspiring intermediaries, such intermediaries would not be precluded “from successfully 
asserting in their own lawsuit that they did not in fact conspire with the chains and are therefore not barred  by the 
co-conspirator doctrine from recovering damages “ from their suppliers.  Id.  This creates “the possibility of 
inconsistent adjudications on the issue of the existence of a vertical conspiracy [which] leaves defendants subject to 
the risk of multiple liability that the Illinois Brick Court found unacceptable.”  Id.  
12 
 
defendants in the suit.
73
  The Third Circuit, moreover, avoids duplicative recovery by permitting 
the coconspirator exception only if the conspiring intermediary was “completely involved” in the 
conspiracy, which would bar the intermediary from maintaining a cause of action against its 
supplier.
74
 
III. Conflicting Judicial Approaches to the Coconspirator Exception 
in the Context of Upstream Price Fixing 
 
A.  Running Into the Wall: The Narrow Coconspirator Exception and the “Price Paid” 
Rule 
The coconspirator exception was severely curtailed by the Ninth Circuit in In re ATM Fee 
Antitrust Litigation,
75
 and the Fourth Circuit in Dickson v. Microsoft Corp.,
76
 resulting in what 
may be termed the “price paid” rule.  Simply stated, the rule provides that an indirect purchaser 
has standing under the coconspirator exception only where a vertical conspiracy has directly 
fixed the price paid by the overcharged plaintiff.
77
  Adopting this bright-line rule would 
therefore deny standing to an indirect purchaser harmed by a vertical conspiracy’s creation of 
pass-through damages.
78
  To justify this prohibitive view of the coconspirator exception, three 
principal arguments emerged from ATM Fee and Dickson:  First, permitting theories of recovery 
dependent on pass-through damages would violate Illinois Brick by forcing courts to engage in 
complex tracing analysis;
79
 second, a broad coconspirator exception would violate the Supreme 
                                                          
73
  See id.; In re Midwest Milk Monopolization Litig., 730 F.2d 528, 530–531 (8th Cir. 1984); McCarthy v. 
Recordex Serv., Inc., 80 F.3d 842, 855 (3d Cir. 1996); Link v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 788 F.2d 918, 931 
(3d Cir. 1986) (collecting cases). 
74
  Howard Hess Dental Labs. Inc. v. Dentsply Int’l., Inc., 424 F.3d 363, 378–379 (3d Cir. 2005). 
75
  In re ATM Fee Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 741, 755 (9th Cir. 2012). 
76
  Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d 193, 215 (4th Cir. 2002). 
77
  Id. at 215; ATM Fee, 686 F.3d at 755. 
78
  See Dickson, 309 F.3d at 215; ATM Fee, 686 F.3d at 755. 
79
  Dickson, 309 F.3d at 215–216; ATM Fee, 686 F.3d at 750. 
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Court’s disapproval of market-by-market exceptions to Illinois Brick;80 and finally, a broad 
exception would spawn artful pleading that upends Illinois Brick.
81
   
 In ATM Fee, the plaintiffs—ATM cardholders—alleged that they had been overcharged 
when they engaged in “foreign ATM transactions,” which occur when cardholders withdraw 
money from their accounts through an ATM not owned by their card-issuing bank.
82
  Critically, 
plaintiffs did not claim that the card-issuing defendant banks conspired to directly fix the foreign 
ATM transaction fee.
83
  Instead, plaintiffs (indirect purchasers) alleged the existence of a vertical 
conspiracy in which foreign ATM owners
84
 and defendant card-issuing banks (direct purchasers) 
conspired to raise “interchange fees,” which are intermediate fees paid by the defendant card-
issuing banks to the ATM owners.
85
  In turn, plaintiffs argued that the defendant banks passed-on 
the inflated interchange fees to ATM cardholders in the form of inflated foreign transaction 
fees.
86
  In other words, the cardholders’ central allegation was that defendant banks and ATM 
owners had “conspired to fix interchange fees for the purpose and effect of fixing foreign ATM 
fees.”87  
                                                          
80
  Dickson, 309 F.3d at 215; ATM Fee, 686 F.3d at 755 n.7.  
81
  Dickson, 309 F.3d at 215. 
82
  ATM Fee, 686 F.3d at 744–745. 
83
  Id. at 744;  Foreign ATM fees were allegedly set by the card-issuing banks individually .  Id. at 745. 
84
  Foreign ATM owners can be divided into three groups: “The first group includes . . . Independent Service 
Organizations (“ISOs”). ISOs own ATMs, but they are not banks and do not issue ATM cards (e.g., grocery stores 
or gas stations).  The second group consists of financial institutions that accept deposits and issue ATM cards, but do 
not own any ATMs (e.g., credit unions or internet banks).  The third and largest . . . group includes financial 
institutions that both issue ATM cards and own ATMs.  The defendant banks . . . fit into this category.”  ATM Fee, 
686 F.3d at 745. 
85
  ATM Fee, 686 F.3d at 746;  The mechanism by which the defendant banks and ATM owners allegedly fixed 
“interchange” fees was the STAR Network, which is comprised of thousands of ATM owners. Id. at 745.  The 
network, which is directly responsible for establishing the interchange fee, was owned and controlled by member 
banks, including defendant banks, until 2001.  Id.  Although the STAR network is now owned by Concord, a 
publicly traded corporation, Concord established a “Network Advisory Board (comprised of the larger member 
banks including Bank Defendants) to advise Concord concerning the interests of the large financial institutions.”  Id.  
86
  Id. 
87
  Id. at 752.  In support of this argument, plaintiffs asserted that “ATM owners have no reason to collect 
interchange fees from card issuers, as they may—and usually do—impose ‘surcharges’ directly on cardholders for 
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 Plaintiffs argued that they had standing under the coconspirator exception: although 
plaintiffs had not paid a directly fixed fee, they had directly purchased from a coconspirator in a 
vertical conspiracy engaged in upstream price-fixing of interchange fees.
88
  The coconspirator 
exception, according to plaintiffs, applied as long as plaintiffs had purchased directly from a 
coconspirator.
89
  In assessing standing, then, it was immaterial that plaintiffs had been harmed by 
pass-on of an upstream overcharge, instead of a directly-fixed price.
90
   
 The District Court for the Northern District of California disagreed with the plaintiffs, 
finding that the case involved a “fairly straightforward application of the rule set forth in Illinois 
Brick.”91  Because plaintiffs’ theory of recovery involved pass-on damages, the court assumed 
there would be a “need to apportion” the overcharge between plaintiffs and the defendant 
banks.
92
  That process, the court stated, would require calculation of the defendants’ pass-
through rate to consumers—such a calculation would involve the challenges of “tracing the 
effects of the overcharge” to determine what portion of the price increase was attributable to the 
overcharge, as opposed to market forces.
93
  The court asserted that these were the “very 
challenges that the Illinois Brick rule was designed to address.”94   
Drawing heavily from the district court opinion, the Ninth Circuit similarly found that 
plaintiffs ran “squarely into the Illinois Brick wall.”95  Fearing complex apportionment, the court 
held that the coconspirator exception only applies if the theory of recovery does not involve 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
foreign ATM transactions.”  Appellants’ Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 3–4, In re ATM Fee Antitrust Litig., No. 
10–17354 (9th Cir. July 26, 2012).   
88
  Id. at 755. 
89
  Id.  
90
  Id.  
91
 In re ATM Fee Antitrust Litig., No. C 04-02676 CRB, 2010 WL 3701912 at *11 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2010) aff'd 
on other grounds, 686 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 2012). 
92
  Id. 
93
  Id. 
94
  Id. 
95
  ATM Fee, 686 F.3d. at 749 (quoting Kendall v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 518 F.3d 1042, 1049 (9th Cir. 2008)). 
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pass-on damages, as is the case where co-conspirators directly fix the price paid by plaintiffs.
96
  
Conversely, where co-conspirators fix an upstream price, the damage theory would rely on the 
“pass-on damages Illinois Brick prohibits.”97   
In addition to complex-apportionment concerns, the ATM Fee court fixated on the 
Supreme Court’s admonition of market-by-market exceptions to Illinois Brick.98  The Ninth 
Circuit asserted that granting standing to indirect purchasers harmed by coconspirators’ 
anticompetitive, upstream conduct would improperly restrict Illinois Brick’s influence.99  
Without further elaboration, the court determined that extension of the co-conspirator exception 
amounted to carving out a new exception for a particular type of market.
100
  The court, as a 
result, found that plaintiffs did not have standing under Illinois Brick.
101
 
As in ATM Fee, the plaintiffs in Dickson v. Microsoft Corp. alleged that they had been 
harmed by a vertical conspiracy’s creation of pass-through damages.102  The plaintiffs (indirect 
purchasers) asserted that Microsoft and OEM defendants (direct purchasers)
103
 had entered into 
anticompetitive licensing agreements that caused the OEMs to pay an inflated price for 
Microsoft’s operating system (OS) and Microsoft software.104  Then, the OEM defendants 
allegedly passed-on the overcharge to plaintiffs in the form of inflated prices for personal 
computers (PCs) and software.
105
  The OEM defendants agreed to be overcharged, plaintiffs 
argued, because the OEM defendants had received side-payments for their complicity consisting 
                                                          
96
  Id. at 750. 
97
  Id. at 752. 
98
  See id. at 755, n.7. 
99
  Id. 
100
  Id. 
101
  Id. at 749. 
102
  Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d 193, 215 (4th Cir. 2002). 
103
  The original equipment manufacturers (OEMs)—direct purchasers of Microsoft’s operating system—consisted 
of Compaq Computer Corporation, Dell Computer Corporation, and PB Electronics, Inc.  Id. at  198. 
104
  Id. at 199. 
105
  Id. at 200. 
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of various discounts, cooperation in product development, and proprietary access to Microsoft 
source code.
106
 
 Plaintiffs argued that the coconspirator exception applied because they had directly 
purchased from a coconspirator.
107
  Illinois Brick did not bar standing, plaintiffs argued, because 
the Supreme Court’s underlying policy concerns had not been implicated:  first, double recovery 
had been prevented by joinder of the OEMs as defendants; second, the OEM’s were themselves 
engaged in the conspiracy, and therefore unlikely to bring a damages claim against Microsoft;  
and third, the damages calculation—the  difference between the “but-for” price of the software 
absent the vertical conspiracy from the price actually paid—would not have involved complex 
tracing or pass-through analysis.
108
   
 The Fourth Circuit disagreed and determined that the coconspirator exception only 
applies to price-fixing conspiracies where the upstream violator and the direct purchaser conspire 
to fix the price paid by the consumer.
109
  The plaintiffs’ broad interpretation of the coconspirator 
exception, the court asserted, would invert Illinois Brick by encouraging “artful pleading.”110  
The court further noted that such a result would be in violation of the Supreme Court’s warning 
in Kansas v. UtiliCorp United
111
 against creating new exceptions to Illinois Brick.
112
  In 
Utilicorp, the Court refused to adopt market-based exceptions to the direct purchaser rule, even 
                                                          
106
  Id. at 199 (citing Gravity, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 127 F.Supp.2d 728, 732 n. 5 (D.Md.2001)); United States v. 
Microsoft Corp., 84 F.Supp.2d 9, 42 (D.D.C.1999)). 
107
  Brief for Appellants at 71, Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d 193 (4th Cir. 2002) (No. 01-2458), 2002 WL    
33032432. 
108
  Id. at 72–75. 
109
  Dickson, 309 F.3d at 215. 
110
  Id. 
111
  Kansas v. UtiliCorp United, Inc., 497 U.S. 199 (1990). 
112
  Dickson, 309 F.3d at 215. 
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where 100% of the overcharge was passed-on to indirect purchasers.
113
  The Fourth Circuit did 
not differentiate between such market-based exceptions and the coconspirator exception.
114
 
 The Dickson court continued by rejecting plaintiffs’ argument that Illinois Brick policy 
concerns were not present.  The Fourth Circuit noted that Illinois Brick had contemplated the 
reluctance of direct purchasers to bring suit against their suppliers, yet the Supreme Court chose 
to express a clear preference for direct-purchaser enforcement anyways.
115
   Also, Illinois Brick-
complexity was unavoidable, according to the court, because calculation of the “but-for” price 
would require the court to calculate the overcharge’s pass-through rate—“the exact analysis that 
Illinois Brick forbids.”116  Although such complexity could have been avoided by awarding the 
plaintiffs 100% of the overcharge, the court refused to grant plaintiffs a “windfall.”117  
Accordingly, the court held that Illinois Brick barred the plaintiffs’ damages claims.118 
B.  Jumping Over the Wall: The Functional Approach to Illinois Brick and the “First 
Non-Conspirator” Rule 
 
 In conflict with the “price paid” rule, the Seventh Circuit and the Third Circuit have 
produced opinions in support of the flexible “first non-conspirator” rule. The rule permits the 
first purchaser from outside of a conspiracy to bring a § 4 claim, even where the claim involves 
pass-through theories.  These cases recognize that Illinois Brick was intended to promote 
vigorous antitrust enforcement—a goal that is compromised by a rigid approach to pass-on 
claims that leaves no parties to uphold the antitrust laws. 
                                                          
113
  UtiliCorp, 497 U.S. at 216. 
114
  See infra Part IV.B. 
115
  Id.  
116
  Id.  
117
  Id. at 216;  An indirect purchaser would receive compensation in excess of harm incurred where the direct 
purchaser does not pass-on the entire overcharge. 
118
  Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d 193, 216 (4th Cir. 2002). 
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The “first non-conspirator” rule was fashioned by Judge Easterbrook in Paper Systems 
Inc. v. Nippon Paper Industries Co.
119
  In Paper Systems, the plaintiffs, paper distributors, 
alleged that five fax paper manufacturers had participated in a price-fixing conspiracy.
120
  Two 
of the manufactures sold exclusively to trading houses (direct purchasers), which resold to 
plaintiffs (indirect purchasers).
121
  The plaintiffs alleged that the trading houses, along with the 
manufacturers, were coconspirators in the price-fixing conspiracy.
122
  Thus, plaintiffs were the 
“first purchasers from outside the conspiracy.”123  Judge Easterbrook, as a result, determined that 
“Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick allocate to the first non-conspirator in the distribution chain the 
right to collect 100% of the damages.”124  The court held that the first non-conspirator may 
collect damages where it can 1) prove the existence of a conspiracy and 2) establish 
overcharges.
125
   
Importantly, the court did not limit the “first non-conspirator” rule to instances where 
coconspirators fixed the “price paid” by the first consumer outside the conspiracy.  Instead, the 
court spoke broadly, stating that plaintiffs, which included consumers that had purchased directly 
from the conspiring-middlemen, were entitled to collect “damages attributable to [their] direct 
purchases.”126  In discussing damages, the court found that the calculation of a pass-through rate, 
or transfer price, would not “transgress Illinois Brick” as long as the process would not lead to 
                                                          
119
  See Paper Sys. Inc. v. Nippon Paper Induss. Co., Ltd., 281 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 2002). 
120
  Id. at 631. 
121
  Id. 
122
  Id.  
123
  Id. (emphasis in original). 
124
  Id. at 632. 
125
  Id. 
126
  Id. 
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duplicative recovery and the difficulties of apportionment along the chain of distribution were 
absent.
127
   
 Similarly, the Third Circuit has produced several cases applying a flexible approach to 
Illinois Brick.  Although these cases do not explicitly adopt the “first non-conspirator” rule, they 
demonstrate that the “first non-conspirator” is the best antitrust enforcer, even where an 
upstream, fixed price has been passed-on.  In In re Sugar Industries Antitrust Litigation,
128
 
plaintiffs—wholesale candy purchasers—alleged that defendant sugar manufacturers had fixed 
wholesale sugar prices.
129
  Importantly, two of the sugar manufacturers also manufactured and 
sold candy directly to plaintiffs.
130
  The Third Circuit therefore faced the following issue: 
whether Illinois Brick denies standing to a plaintiff who directly purchased a product (candy) 
from a conspirator that had fixed the price of an upstream ingredient (sugar).
131
   
In determining that Illinois Brick was not controlling, the Third Circuit stressed that the 
plaintiff had purchased directly from a conspirator.
132
  Although calculating the impact of 
inflated sugar prices on candy prices might have proved difficult, Illinois Brick’s greatest 
concern—the “difficulty in computation . . . in parceling out damages among entities in the 
chain”—was not present.133  The court was also concerned that rigid application of Illinois Brick 
would “leave a gaping hole in the administration of the antitrust laws” by allowing would-be 
conspirators to escape antitrust scrutiny “simply by incorporating the tainted element into 
                                                          
127
  Id. at 633. 
128
  In re Sugar Indus. Antitrust Litig., 579 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1978). 
129
  Id. at 15. 
130
  Id. 
131
  Id. at 16. 
132
  Id. at 17. 
133
  Id.  
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another product.”134  Adopting this rigid view of Illinois Brick, the court emphasized, would 
undermine deterrence and would therefore be “contrary to the spirit of the antitrust laws . . . .”135  
Consequently,  Sugar clarifies that Illinois Brick permits the first non-conspirator standing even 
where defendants’ fixed the price of an upstream input instead of the price paid by plaintiffs, as 
long as there is no apportionment of damages along the chain of distribution.  
 Similarly, in In re Linerboard Antitrust Litigation,
136
 plaintiffs brought suit against 
integrated manufacturers of corrugated boxes, corrugated sheets, and linerboard.
137
  Plaintiffs 
alleged that defendants had restricted output of linerboard—a component of corrugated boxes 
and corrugated sheets—and then passed-on the inflated prices of linerboard by directly selling 
the finished boxes and sheets at supra-competitive prices to plaintiffs.
138
  The Third Circuit re-
affirmed its holding in Sugar, finding that plaintiffs were “entitled to recover the full amount of 
any overcharge,” even though defendants had not directly fixed price paid by plaintiffs.139 
 Extending the logic of Sugar and Linerboard to the coconspirator context, the Third 
Circuit expressly rejected the “price paid” rule in Howard Hess Dental Laboratories Inc. v. 
Dentsply International, Inc., recognizing that the first non-conspirator may deserve standing, 
even where pass-through theories are involved.
140
  In Dentsply, plaintiffs—indirect purchasers of 
artificial teeth—argued that they had standing under the coconspirator exception because they 
                                                          
134
  Id. at 18. The court explained how would-be conspirators could exploit the loophole: “[A] refiner who illegally 
set the price of sugar could shield itself by putting all of the sugar into a new product, a syrup, simply by adding 
water and perhaps a little flavoring. We do not think the antitrust laws should be so easily evaded.”  Id. 
135
  Id. (citing Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int’l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968) (“[T]he purposes of the 
antitrust laws are best served by insuring that the private action will be an ever-present threat to deter any one 
contemplating business behavior in violation of the antitrust laws.”)). 
136
  In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 305 F.3d 145 (3d Cir. 2002). 
137
  Id. at 148. 
138
  Id. at 151, 159. 
139
  Id. at 159–160. 
140
  See Howard Hess Dental Labs. Inc. v. Dentsply Int’l., Inc., 424 F.3d 363, 381 (3d Cir. 2005).  While the court 
did not go as far as Paper Systems, which provided the first non-conspirator with a general grant of standing, 
Dentsply recognized that the first non-conspirator deserves standing where the middlemen would be barred by the 
complete involvement defense.  Id. at 380 n.13. 
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had purchased directly from Dentply’s dealers, and that the dealers (along with Dentsply) were 
coconspirators in an exclusive-dealing conspiracy.
141
  The court first acknowledged the 
unquestioned availability of the coconspirator exception for retail price maintenance (RPM) 
conspiracies,
142
 which is another way of describing the traditional coconspirator exception 
recognized by the “price paid” rule.143  Next, the court asked whether the coconspirator 
exception extended beyond the “price paid” rule to non-RPM conspiracies, which would include 
“exclusive-dealing or [upstream] price-fixing at the manufacturer level.”144  A non-RPM 
conspiracy, the Third Circuit explained, would potentially “allow Dentsply to charge its dealers a 
supra-competitive price at wholesale.”145  The dealers, in turn, would pass-on some portion of 
the overcharge to plaintiffs.
146
  The court noted that the economics of a “non-RPM” conspiracy 
may be viable where a mechanism exists to compensate the middleman for effectively agreeing 
to be overcharged.
147
  
Rejecting the “price paid” rule, the Dentsply court formulated a “limited” coconspirator 
exception to cover non-RPM conspiracies.
148
  The court stated that the “limited” exception 
would only apply “where the middleman would be barred from bringing a claim against their 
former co-conspirator . . . because their involvement in the conspiracy was ‘truly complete.’”149  
                                                          
141
  Id. at 378. 
142
  Id. at 378. 
143
  “Resale price maintenance” describes a vertical price fixing scheme in which the initial seller and the direct 
purchaser fix the downstream, retail price, or the “price paid” by consumers.  Id. at 377 n.9. 
144
  Id.;  The “exclusive-dealing” option reflects the alleged scheme in Dentsply and Dickson, while manufacturer-
level price-fixing reflects the scheme alleged in In re ATM.  Supra notes 85, 104–106, 141 and accompanying text.  
145
  Id. at 380. 
146
  Id.  
147
  Id. at 378 n.12;  The Dentsply court explained that the compensation mechanism, or side-payment, might have 
been Dentsply’s role in policing a dealer-level, horizontal price-fixing conspiracy that generated extra profit for the 
dealers.  Id. 
148
  Dentsply, 424 F.3d at 378. 
149
  Id. at 378–379;  In Dentsply, the dealers’ involvement in the exclusive-dealing conspiracy was not truly 
complete due to the following District Court findings:  first, the dealers were not “substantially equal” participants in 
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A middleman’s involvement would be “truly complete” where the court could bar the 
middleman from suing a manufacturer who successfully brings the “complete involvement 
defense.”150 
The court analyzed the exception in light of the policy concerns enunciated by Illinois 
Brick.  The court first reasoned that the limited exception would avoid the risk of duplicative 
recovery by barring completely-involved middlemen from recovery.
151
  Second, the exception 
avoided Illinois Brick’s related concern for efficient antitrust enforcement by guaranteeing a non-
diluted recovery for middlemen not completely involved in the conspiracy.
152
  Finally, the third 
Illinois Brick concern—complex apportionment of overcharges—was diminished because “there 
would be no need to ‘apportion’ damages between direct and indirect purchasers under the 
limited exception.”153  The court, however, determined that plaintiffs were eligible to recover 
only the portion of the overcharge passed-on by the middlemen, reasoning that the portion of the 
overcharge that the middlemen absorbed would not injure plaintiffs.
154
  Although apportionment 
along the chain of distribution would not be required, courts would still face the complex task of 
calculating the pass-through rate of the overcharge, which, the Dentsply court asserted, would cut 
against the grain of Illinois Brick.
155
  Although the limited exception would result in pass-
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the conspiracy;  second, the dealers’ participation was not “voluntary in any meaningful sense.”  Id. at 384 (quoting 
Dist Ct. Mem. Op. at 20–21 (Dec. 19, 2001)). 
150
 Dentsply, 424 F.3d at 379;  The “complete involvement defense” bars a plaintiff’s cause of action against a 
conspirator where the plaintiff participated in, and was completely involved in, the conspiracy.  Id. at 381. “[E]very 
Court of Appeals that has decided the issue has held that antitrust plaintiffs who were involved in a conspiracy at a 
requisite level are barred from suing.” Id. at 382.  
151
  Id. 424 F.3d at 380. 
152
  Id. at 381. 
153
  Id. at 380 n.15. 
154
  Id. at 380 n.14;  But cf Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 494 (1968) (creating a 
regime under which plaintiffs could receive a windfall by recovering for injuries not absorbed);  Supra notes 204–
209 and accompanying text. 
155
 Dentsply, 424 F.3d at 380 n.15;  Had the court permitted plaintiffs to recover the entire overcharge (giving 
plaintiffs a windfall), there would be no need to calculate the overcharge’s pass-through rate. Under this set of 
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through calculations, the court held that adopting no exception at all—the result created by the 
“price paid” rule—would be even less desirable.156  Citing to Illinois Brick’s ultimate aim of 
encouraging “vigorous private enforcement of antitrust laws,”157 the court was unwilling to find 
that “no plaintiff outside the [non-RPM] conspiracy” had standing.158 
IV.  Rejecting the “Price Paid” Rule in Favor of the “First Non-Conspirator” Rule: a 
Review of Economic Commentary and Supreme Court Precedent 
 
A. The Roadmap to Antitrust Immunity 
The central problem created by the “price paid” rule is that it generates a roadmap for 
would-be conspirators to avoid antitrust laws.
159
  In Sugar and Linerboard, the Third Circuit 
recognized that rigid application of Illinois Brick would leave a hole in the antitrust laws: in 
those cases, the courts refused to immunize vertically integrated producers that 1) inflated the 
price of an upstream input and 2) incorporated the inflated price into a downstream commodity it 
sold directly to consumers.
160
  The roadmap to antitrust immunity created by the “price paid” 
rule effectively mirrors the loophole recognized by the Third Circuit. The only difference is that 
the “price paid” roadmap adds an additional component to the mix: where an upstream producer 
is unable to implement its scheme unilaterally—as was the case in Sugar and Linerboard—the 
producer must establish a vertical scheme that enlists the help of its direct purchasers. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
circumstances, the limited exception would completely avoid Illinois Brick’s concern with complexity.  Id. at 380 
n.14. 
156
  Id. at 381 (citing In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust Litig., 998 F.2d 1144, 1169 (3d Cir.1993) (“[W]hile 
complex apportionment problems are implicated here, we do not hold that litigation must be avoided solely because 
it might be difficult to ascertain damages. Injured parties cannot be penalized and left without recourse because 
measurement of their damages is difficult.”)). 
157
  Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 745 (1977)). 
158
  Dentsply, 424 F.3d at 381. 
159
  Amici Curiae Brief of Interested Retailers and the American Antitrust Institute in Support of Appellants’ Petition 
for Rehearing En Banc at 3, In re Atm Fee Antitrust Litig., No. 10–17354 (9th Cir. Aug. 6, 2012). 
160
  See In re Sugar Indus. Antitrust Litig., 579 F.2d 13, 18 (3d Cir. 1978); In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 305 F.3d 
145, 159–160 (3d Cir. 2002);  supra III.B. 
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Recent economic literature has recognized that Illinois Brick can be exploited by such 
vertical schemes, creating a blueprint for immunity from antitrust laws.
161
  By sharing monopoly 
profits with its direct purchasers, an upstream cartel can ensure its direct purchasers (the only 
parties eligible to sue under the “price paid” rule) lack incentive to bring suit.162  Direct 
purchasers (who, at the outset, are overcharged) receive “side-payments” as compensation for 
their complicity, ranging from “hush money to grease the palms of key decision makers to overt 
money transfers between the companies.”163  The direct purchasers, in turn, pass-on the 
overcharge to its customers, injuring the remaining chain of production and reducing total 
welfare.
164
  If successful, “[t]he cartel is effectively shielded from exposure through private 
litigation by an ‘Illinois Wall’ of direct purchasers.”165 
Successful implementation of the “price paid” roadmap would require satisfaction of 
several conditions.  First, the side-payment should exceed the sum of 1) the opportunity cost 
forfeited by direct purchasers’ in declining to bring a civil action,166 2) the direct purchasers’ lost 
profits as a consequence of a reduced volume in sales,
167
 and 3) any portion of the overcharge 
absorbed by the direct purchaser.  Second, the upstream cartel must be able to prevent its direct 
                                                          
161
  See Maarten Pieter Schinkel, Jan Tuinstra & Jacob Rüggeberg, Illinois Walls: How Barring Indirect Purchaser 
Suits Facilitates Collusion, (Amsterdam Ctr. for Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 2005-02, 2008); The authors of 
Illinois Walls discuss how upstream cartels could effectuate the blueprint for immunity through tacit cooperation 
with direct purchasers.  Id. at 19.  Implementation of the blueprint through overt cooperation would be nearly 
identical, with the exception that the side-payment scheme would exist pursuant to an illegal, vertical agreement 
between the upstream cartel and direct purchasers.   
162
  Id. at 3; see also Edmund H. Mantell, Denial of a Forum to Indirect-Purchaser Victims of Price Fixing 
Conspiracies: A Legal and Economic Analysis of Illinois Brick, 2 PACE L. REV. 153, 217 n.157 (1982) (“Direct 
purchasers in such an enviable position will be understandably reluctant to kill the goose that lays the golden eggs 
by suing the price-fixers.”). 
163
  Schinkel, supra note 161 at 3;  The facts in Dickson and Denstply present possible examples of this side-
payment scheme.  Supra notes 104–106, 141, 147 and accompanying text.  
164
  Id.; The “direct purchaser customers react . . . to the increase in the price of one of their factor inputs by raising 
the price to their customers ,” resulting in “gross injury” to the downstream chain.  Mantell, supra note 162 at 214. 
165
  Schinkel, supra note 161 at 3. 
166
  Id. at 4; The opportunity cost would be sizeable due to the availability of treble damages.  Id.  
167
  Mantell, supra note 162 at 214 (The transfer payment must compensate the direct purchaser for the “profits lost . 
. . as a consequence of their price/output adaptation to the cost increase”). 
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purchasers from defecting and bringing suit.
168
  Third, the upstream cartel’s profits, reduced by 
the side-payments, must be greater than the profits that the cartel could earn under competitive 
conditions.
169
  Finally, the market structure must incentivize collusion between the upstream 
cartel and the direct purchasers: the most plausible scenario is where the cartel sells a product 
subject to inelastic demand to only a few, large direct purchasers.
170
 
 The “price paid” rule bars indirect purchasers from bringing suit against conspirators 
engaged in the above scheme, allowing upstream producers and direct purchasers to “exploit 
their common interest at the expense of . . .  indirect purchasers”171 with impunity.172  This rigid 
constraint on the coconspirator exception results in a “perversion of the spirit of antitrust 
legislation” by incapacitating the “very parties who are likely to be the most vigorous private 
enforcers of the antitrust laws.”173  Notably, neither of the circuits adopting the “price paid” rule 
dismissed (or even discussed) the roadmap created by their decisions, focusing instead on a 
mechanical, and ultimately incorrect, reading of Illinois Brick. 
B. Market-Based Exceptions 
                                                          
168
  Schinkel, supra note 161 at 4. 
169
  Id.  
170
  Mantell, supra note 162 at 213;  Where there are only a few, large direct purchasers, the “situation resembles 
bilateral monopoly.”  Id.  Under these market conditions, the side-payment scheme is viable because buyers and 
sellers have the incentive to “exploit their common interest at the expense of third parties, the indirect purchasers.”  
Id.  Conversely, where direct purchasers are “numerous and relatively small,” the cartel would be more likely 
unilaterally extract monopoly return from direct purchasers.  Id.  Additionally, the side-payment scheme is more 
likely to occur in product markets subject to inelastic demand because conspirators will have an increased ability to 
pass-on price increases down the chain and therefore maximize total monopoly profit.  See id. at 216 n.156. 
171
  Id. at 213. 
172
 Amici Curiae Brief of Interested Retailers and the American Antitrust Institute in Support of Appellants’ Petition 
for Rehearing En Banc, supra note 159, at  19 (“If you want to avoid application of the antitrust laws, conspire with 
a middleman to fix the price of a component part of something the middleman sells . . . . Under the [price paid rule] . 
. . both conspirators are immune from antitrust prosecution by the private attorney general contemplated by § 4.”). 
173
  Mantell, supra note 162 at 218; see also, Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d 193, 223 (4th Cir. 2002) 
(Gregory, J., dissenting) (The “price paid” rule “is essentially a free pass to any conspiracy that can make the 
damage it inflicts difficult to pin down . . . . Until now, that has never been the law.”); Amici Curiae Brief of 
Interested Retailers and the American Antitrust Institute in Support of Appellants’ Petition for Rehearing En Banc, 
supra note 159 at 19 (“When you deny standing to the true direct purchaser outside of the conspiracy, you 
effectively immunize the conspiracy from civil liability. There is simply no question that such a result was not what 
the Supreme Court intended in either Illinois Brick or Utilicorp.”).  
26 
 
 
 The “price paid” rule relies on the argument that extension of the coconspirator exception 
would undermine Illinois Brick by violating the Supreme Court’s disapproval of market-by-
market exceptions to the direct purchaser rule expressed in Illinois Brick and UtiliCorp.
174
  In 
UtiliCorp, plaintiffs sought an exception to Illinois Brick based on the economics of the natural 
gas market:  because the gas market resulted in a 100% pass-on of overcharges to indirect 
purchasers, plaintiffs argued that there was no reason to fear the complex process of calculating 
pass-through admonished by Illinois Brick.
175
  The Supreme Court rejected this argument, 
reasoning that future indirect purchasers would similarly argue that their market situation 
allowed for manageable pass-on calculations and that they, too, deserved a market-based 
exception to Illinois Brick.
176
  Echoing the logic behind the Illinois Brick warning against 
market-by-market exceptions, the Court asserted that the judiciary would be burdened by an 
unwieldy classification system for varying market situations coupled with endless litigation 
“over where the line should be drawn” for each market.177  The Court predicted that such a 
system would result in the same “massive evidence and complicated theories” the direct 
purchaser rule sought to avoid in the first place.
178
 
 The coconspirator exception, however, is not a market-based exception to the direct 
purchaser rule.  Instead, the exception is legally based, a recognition that different rules apply to 
different kinds of conspiracies (not different kinds of markets).
179
  The coconspirator exception 
                                                          
174
  See supra note 80 and accompanying text.  
175
  Kansas v. UtiliCorp United, Inc., 497 U.S. 199, 208 (1990). 
176
  Id. at 216. 
177
  Id. (quoting Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 745 (1977)). 
178
  Id. (quoting Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 745). 
179
  See Dee-K Enters., Inc. v. Heveafil Sdn. Bd., 982 F. Supp. 1138, 1153 (E.D. Va. 1997) (The Supreme Court’s 
warning against exceptions “was made in the context of a plaintiff seeking an exception for a particular industry, not 
an exception for certain corporate structures and relationships . . . .); In re Cathode Ray Tube Antitrust Litig., No. 
MDL 1917, 2012 WL 5987861 at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 29 2012) (The coconspirator exception is “not based on 
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serves as a reminder that while Illinois Brick bars indirect purchaser claims against horizontal 
conspiracies transacting with innocent direct purchasers, a different set of rules apply to claims 
against vertical conspiracies between producers and direct purchasers.
180
  As a result, the 
coconspirator exception is not really an exception at all, but a categorical rule that Illinois Brick 
does not apply where plaintiffs have purchased directly from a vertical conspiracy.
181
 
 In support of the “price paid” rule, the courts in Dickson and In re ATM advanced an odd 
argument: after recognizing that the coconspirator exception has been firmly established among 
the circuits, the courts, without explanation, asserted that extension of the exception violated the 
Supreme Court’s warning against market-based exceptions.182  But broadening the coconspirator 
exception does not create a new market-based exception to Illinois Brick; instead, it is a legal 
recognition that courts should not deny standing to the first innocent purchaser from a vertical 
conspiracy, regardless of the method used by the conspiracy to implement its scheme.  And, as 
discussed above, the coconspirator exception is really a categorical rule that Illinois Brick is 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
market-specific factors” nor “case-specific factors.”  Instead, the exception applies where Illinois Brick’s “policy of 
encouraging private antitrust suits would be stymied by mechanical application of its bright-line rule.”). 
180
 See Lowell v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 177 F.3d 1228, 1232–1233 (11th Cir. 1999) (The coconspirator exception  is 
not “based on the facts of a particular market;  Illinois Brick simply does not apply to this kind of conspiracy.”); 
Amici Curiae Brief of Interested Retailers and the American Antitrust Institute in Support of Appellants’ Petition for 
Rehearing En Banc, supra note 159 at 18 (The coconspirator exception is “not based on the economics of a 
particular industry, which the Supreme Court disapproved in Illinois Brick and UtiliCorp . . . . Rather, these 
decisions simply support the proposition that the direct purchaser rule has no application until one is outside the 
conspiracy.”).  
181
 See In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599, 604 (7th Cir. 1997) (Where plaintiffs 
purchase directly from a vertical conspiracy, “any indirect-purchaser defense would go by the board . . . .”); Lowell, 
177 F.3d at 1232 (“Illinois Brick does not apply to a single vertical conspiracy where the plaintiff has purchased 
directly from a conspiring party in the chain of distribution.” ); see also California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 
97 (1989) (“Indirect purchasers” include only those who “did not purchase . . . directly from the price-fixing 
defendants.”) (emphasis added); Kansas v. UtiliCorp United, Inc., 497 U.S. 199, 207 (1990) (Plaintiffs are “indirect 
purchasers” if “they are not the immediate buyers from the alleged antitrust violators.”) (emphasis added).  
182
  Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d 193, 215 (4th Cir. 2002); In re ATM Fee Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 741, 
755 n.7 (9th Cir. 2012). 
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inapplicable to all claims alleging vertical conspiracy.
183
  It would be odd to shape the scope of a 
rule which says that Illinois Brick does not apply by (incorrectly) applying Illinois Brick.  
C. Theories of Recovery Based on Pass-Through Damages  
 The “price paid” rule further relies on the argument that extension of the coconspirator 
exception violates Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick by permitting a theory of recovery that 
requires complex pass-through calculations.
184
  This argument fails for three reasons. First, when 
Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick discussed pass-through damages, the Supreme Court did not 
contemplate a vertical conspiracy involving direct purchasers. Second, calculation of the pass-
through rate is not always required, as alternative econometric techniques are available to 
measure damages. Finally, even if pass-through calculations are barred, and there are no 
alternative ways to calculate damages, courts have a simple alternative: award indirect 
purchasers the full overcharge. Although the award might give plaintiffs a windfall gain, such a 
result is consistent with Hanover Shoe. 
Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick did not create a per se ban on all theories of recovery 
dependent on complex pass-through calculations.  In Hanover Shoe, the Court was critical of 
pass-on arguments in the context of defensive pass-on, reasoning that the pass-on defense would 
lead to under-enforcement of antitrust laws and poor deterrence of antitrust violators.
185
  While 
Hanover Shoe was also generally critical of pass-through calculations,
186
 the Court did not have 
the opportunity to consider pass-through in the context of a vertical conspiracy, where the first 
                                                          
183
  Supra note 181 and accompanying text. 
184
  Dickson, 309 F.3d at 215–216; ATM Fee, 686 F.3d at 750. 
185
 See Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 494 (1968); Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 
U.S. 720, 734–735 (1977) (“[W]e understand Hanover Shoe as resting on the judgment that the antitrust laws will be 
more effectively enforced by concentrating the full recovery for the overcharge in the direct purchasers rather than 
by allowing every plaintiff potentially affected by the overcharge to sue only for the amount it could show was 
absorbed by it.”). 
186
  Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 492–493. 
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non-conspirators are the best antitrust enforcers. Banning all pass-through theories, in this 
context, would generate the very result that Hanover Shoe sought to avoid—allowing antitrust 
violators to “retain the fruits of their illegality.”187 
In Illinois Brick, the Court considered pass-through complexity in conjunction with other 
policy factors such as apportionment along the entire chain of distribution, duplicative recovery, 
and efficient enforcement of antitrust laws.
188
  While the Court recognized that pass-through 
complexity, alone, was undesirable, the Court’s principal fear was the combination of its 
concerns:  an apportionment process that would require complex pass-through calculations at 
multiple links in a long distribution chain.
189
  Weighing the combined impact of these factors,
190
 
the Court denied standing to indirect purchasers who alleged that they had incurred pass-through 
damages subsequent to a horizontal conspiracy’s overcharge of innocent direct purchasers.191  
While the Court clearly expressed its aversion to pass-through calculations in that context, the 
Court did not hold that pass-through calculations were to be prohibited in all contexts.
192
   
In the context of the broad coconspirator exception, there would be no danger of 
duplicative recovery, the pass-through calculation would occur at only one link in the chain, and 
direct purchasers would not be the best antitrust enforcers.
193
  And, because Illinois Brick is 
categorically inapplicable to allegations of vertical conspiracy, lower courts faced with such 
                                                          
187
 Id. at 494. 
188
 See Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 720, 730, 736, 737, 745–746 (1977). 
189
  See id at 745. 
190
  Id. (“The combination of increasing the costs and diffusing the benefits of bringing a treble-damages action 
could seriously impair the important weapon of antitrust enforcement.” ) (emphasis added). 
191
  Id. at 726–727, 728–729. 
192
  See Laumann v. Natl. Hockey League, No. 12 CIV. 1817 SAS, 2012 WL 6043225 at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2012) 
(“[T]he purpose of Illinois Brick was not to prevent the only non-conspirators in a multi-level distribution chain . . . 
from bringing a private antitrust suit.”); Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d 193, 223 (4th Cir. 2002) (Gregory, J., 
dissenting) (“The real concern of Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick is the complexity of measuring the pass-on of an 
actual overcharge, and its potential negative effect on deterrence and compensation, not the mere difficulties 
determining what the price would have been in a competitive market.”) . 
193
  See Dickson, 309 F.3d at 221–223 (Gregory, J., dissenting). 
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allegations could assess the propriety of pass-through calculations on independent grounds.  The 
court in Dentsply, for example, found that pass-through calculations were acceptable, as the 
alternative—denying all recovery outside the vertical conspiracy—was even less desirable.194  
Similarly, in Sugar, the court acknowledged that it would be difficult to calculate the rate at 
which a sugar price overcharge was passed-on to candy prices, but that such difficulties did not 
compare to performing pass-through calculations along an entire distribution chain.
195
  The 
alternative—to leave a “gaping hole in the administration of the antitrust laws”—was 
unacceptable.
196
  Finally, the court in Paper Systems determined that pass-through calculations 
were permissible as long as apportionment along the chain of distribution and duplicative 
recovery were absent.
197
 
Moreover, modern econometric techniques may allow courts to calculate damages 
without calculating the pass-on rate; as a result, courts would avoid some of the difficulties 
associated with pass-through analysis, including elasticity measurements.
198
  When measuring 
damages (the amount by which indirect purchasers were overcharged) courts have several 
options.
199
  They can calculate the overcharge head-on, which would require a determination of 
the overcharge’s pass-through rate from the direct purchaser to the indirect purchaser (the 
method criticized by Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick)—use of this process, however, is 
                                                          
194
  Howard Hess Dental Labs. Inc. v. Dentsply Int’l., Inc., 424 F.3d 363, 381 (3d Cir. 2005). 
195
  In re Sugar Indus. Antitrust Litig., 579 F.2d 13, 18 (3d Cir. 1978). 
196
  Id. 
197
 Paper Sys. Inc. v. Nippon Paper Induss. Co., Ltd., 281 F.3d 629, 633 (7th Cir. 2002). 
198
 The difficulty of performing elasticity measurements appears to be the Illinois Brick Court’s primary concern 
with pass-through analysis.  See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 741 (1977). 
199
 See EUROPEAN COMMISSION DG COMPETITION, DRAFT GUIDANCE PAPER: QUANTIFYING HARM IN ACTIONS FOR 
DAMAGES BASED ON BREACHES OF ARTICLE 101 OR 102 OF THE TREATY ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN 
UNION 48 (2011). (“[W]here an indirect customer brings a claim for compensation of an overcharge caused by a 
cartel, that indirect customer can either show that there was an initial overcharge and that this overcharge was passed 
on to him or he may quantify the overcharge passed on to his level in the same manner as a direct customer would 
quantify an initial overcharge, namely by comparing the actual price he paid with the likely price in a non-
infringement scenario . . . .”). 
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uncommon, even in state courts that allow indirect purchaser lawsuits.
200
  Alternatively, indirect 
purchasers can calculate the difference between the price they actually paid with the “but-for” 
price, or the price absent the conspiracy—the formula already used in traditional overcharge 
cases.
201
  In calculating the “but-for” price, courts can avoid pass-through analysis by using 
comparator-based methods,
202
 such as the “before and after” method and the “yardstick” 
method.
203
 
 Finally, even if Hanover Shoe and Illinois brick effectuate a per se ban on pass-through 
calculations, and there are no alternative ways to calculate damages, courts can avoid pass-
through complexity altogether by awarding indirect purchasers the entire overcharge paid by 
direct purchasers. In Royal Printing Co. v. Kimberly Clark Corp.,
204
 the plaintiff, an indirect 
purchaser, alleged that defendant manufacturers of paper products had overcharged their 
wholesale divisions, which allegedly passed-on the overcharge to plaintiff.
205
  Because the Ninth 
Circuit interpreted the Illinois Brick criticism of pass-on calculations as a binding prohibition on 
                                                          
200
 See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, ¶ 346k1 (“To be sure, one way to compute 
passed-on overcharges is by assessing demand and supply elasticities and querying how much the intermediary will 
absorb, how much it will raise its price, how much it will pass on, and what its output reduction would be.  
However, that is not the typical way in which passed-on damages are computed in litigation.”).   
201
  European Commission DG Competition, supra note 199 at 8–9; See also Areeda, supra note 200 (“To be sure, 
the overcharge paid by the consumer has been passed on, but computation of passed-on damages is not invariably 
more complex than computation of direct purchaser overcharges.”). 
202
  Areeda, supra note 200 (“Most damage models that estimate indirect purchaser damages do not compute the 
pass-on at all.”); European Commission DG Competition, supra note 199 at 48 (“[C]omparator-based methods can 
provide useful insights into the amount of overcharge paid by indirect customers, without it being necessary to 
identify the degree of pass-on . . . . By using a time comparison, for instance, for the prices paid by the indirect 
customer before and during the infringement, it can be possible to ascertain how much those prices rose because of 
the infringement, without having to make a finding concerning the pass-on rate.”). 
203
  The “before and after” method compares prices prior to (or after) the anticompetitive conduct with prices while 
the conduct was occurring.  Areeda, supra note 200.  The “yardstick” method compares the price in the 
anticompetitive market with the price in a similar, competitive market.  Id.  Neither method requires pass-through 
calculations.  Id.  
204
 Royal Printing Co. v. Kimberly Clark Corp., 621 F.2d 323 (9th Cir. 1980).  Notably, Royal Printing involved the 
“control exception,” not the coconspirator exception.  Nevertheless, the court’s logic is directly applicable here:  
“The two exceptions share a common logic—where the relationship between the parties in a multi-tiered distribution 
chain is such that plaintiffs are the first or only victims of alleged anticompetitive agreements, the rationale for the 
Illinois Brick bar disappears.”  Laumann v. Natl. Hockey League, No. 12 CIV. 1817 SAS, 2012 WL 6043225 at *6 
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2012). 
205
 Royal Printing, 621 F.2d at 324, 327. 
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all pass-on theories, it faced two alternatives: award the indirect purchaser the entire overcharge 
occurring at the wholesale level, or bar indirect purchaser-standing completely.
206
  The court 
chose the first option, arguing that barring standing was intolerable because it “would close off 
every avenue for private enforcement of the antitrust laws . . . .”207  The Royal Printing court 
recognized that the downside of awarding indirect purchasers the full overcharge is that it 
presents them with “an opportunity for a windfall gain.”208  But Hanover Shoe, the court 
emphasized, “teaches that in such situations there is nothing wrong with the plaintiff winning a 
windfall gain, so long as the antitrust laws are vindicated and the defendant does not suffer 
multiple liability . . . .”209  
D. Artful Pleading 
 Finally, the “price paid” rule relies on the argument that the broad coconspirator 
exception would generate artful pleading that evades and inverts Illinois Brick.
210
  This concern 
is misplaced for two reasons.  First, bare allegations of vertical conspiracy do not suffice under 
the heightened pleading standards created by Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.
211
  Pursuant to 
Twombly, plaintiffs must allege facts moving the vertical conspiracy over “the line between 
                                                          
206
  Id. at 327. 
207
  Id.; see also Freeman v. San Diego Ass'n of Realtors, 322 F.3d 1133, 1145 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[I]ndirect 
purchasers can sue for damages if there is no realistic possibility that the direct purchaser will sue it supplier over 
the antitrust violation.”) 
208
  Royal Printing, 621 F.2d at 327; The windfall gain would result where indirect purchasers “recover an amount, 
trebled, that exceeds its actual damages (because market forces probably forced the middlemen to absorb part of the 
overcharge) . . . .”  Id. 
209
  Id. at 327.  Highlighting the “price paid” rule’s unwarranted hostility towards pass-through calculations, the 
combination of Royal Printing and In re ATM produces an odd result in the Ninth Circuit:  “[P]urchasers who pay 
overcharges indisputably ‘passed on’ by subsidiaries of conspirators will have standing (per Royal Printing), but 
those who pay overcharges even arguably ‘passed on’ by the conspirators themselves will lack for standing.”  
Appellants’ Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 3–4, In re ATM Fee Antitrust Litig., No. 10–17354 (9th Cir. July 26, 
2012). 
210
  Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d 193, 215 (4th Cir. 2002); See also Appellees’ Response to Petition for 
Rehearing En Banc at 15, In re Atm Fee Antitrust Litig., No. 10–17354 (9th Cir. July 31, 2012) (“[I]f an allegation 
that a manufacturer and a middleman ‘fixed’ the manufacturer’s price to the middleman were alone sufficient to 
confer standing on consumers . . . the Illinois Brick rule could be easily evaded: any arms-length middleman buyer 
could be characterized as a ‘conspirator’ with respect to the price it agreed to pay the manufacturer seller.”). 
211
 Bell A. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
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possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” 212  In doing so, allegations of conscious 
parallelism are insufficient; plaintiffs must instead present “allegations plausibly suggesting (not 
merely consistent with) agreement . . . .”213  Twombly, as a result, has significantly raised the 
hurdle for antitrust plaintiffs at the pleading stage, undermining the notion that plaintiffs could 
easily avoid Illinois Brick through artful pleading.
214
 
In Temple v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., for example, consumer plaintiffs (indirect 
purchasers) alleged a vertical conspiracy between Visa and MasterCard and merchants of Visa 
and MasterCard (direct purchasers).
215
  Plaintiffs alleged that the merchants—who had been 
overcharged due to the “unlawful tying practices of Visa and MasterCard”—had entered into an 
agreement with Visa and MasterCard to pass on the inflated prices to consumers.
216
  Plaintiffs, 
however, failed to provide any facts that supported the existence of an anticompetitive agreement 
or conspiracy.
217
  The Temple court determined that the merchants’ conduct could have resulted 
from either vertical conspiracy or independent decision-making.
218
  The Temple court therefore 
dismissed the claim, noting that plaintiffs had provided only a “naked assertion” of vertical 
conspiracy in an attempt to avoid Illinois Brick.
219
  Temple serves as evidence, then, that artful 
pleading of a vertical conspiracy is unlikely to upend Illinois Brick. 
                                                          
212
 Id. at 557. The Supreme Court sought to curb abusive discovery in antitrust cases by avoiding “the potentially 
enormous expense of discovery . . . .”  Id.  
213
  Id.  
214
  See Hovenkamp, supra note 13 at 689 ( “Twombly has had a significant impact on antitrust pleading—both 
greatly increasing the percentage of dismissals and producing longer and more factually detailed complaint.”). 
215
 Temple v. Cir. City Stores, Inc., No. 06 CV 5303 (JG), 2007 WL 2790154, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2007). 
216
  Id. at *1, *2.  The merchants agreed to pay the inflated fees, according to plaintiffs, for “business reasons,” 
including the fear that merchants would otherwise lose their business with Visa and MasterCard entirely.  Id. at 2. 
217
 Id. at 7. 
218
  Temple, No. 06 CV 5303 (JG), 2007 WL 2790154, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2007). 
219
  Id.  
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Second, Rule 11 sanctions are available to curb abuses of pleading rules.
220
  As the 
dissent in Dickson noted, artful pleading concerns are not relevant to standing issues under 
Illinois Brick and Hanover Shoe.
221
  The dissent reasoned that the “direct purchaser rule is 
designed to encourage and incentivize private enforcement of the antitrust laws, not immunize 
corporate wrongdoers from having to litigate antitrust claims.”222  
E. The Efficacy of the “First Non-Conspirator” Rule 
The coconspirator exception is premised on a straightforward principle: direct purchasers 
engaged in a vertical conspiracy to harm downstream customers lack incentive to enforce 
antitrust laws.
223
  Unlike the “price paid” rule, the “first nonconspirator” rule correctly applies 
the coconspirator exception by encouraging litigation against all vertical conspiracies that exploit 
downstream consumers—the method by which the harm is consummated, whether it be fixing 
the “price paid” or the pass-on of an upstream overcharge, is irrelevant. In doing so, the “first 
nonconspirator” rule furthers the goals of Illinois Brick—deterrence and efficiency—by granting 
standing to the best antitrust enforcer:  the first purchaser from outside the conspiracy.
224
     
Granting standing to the first nonconspirator from a vertical conspiracy avoids the 
concerns expressed by Illinois Brick.  First, the concern that indirect-purchaser standing would 
dilute the incentives of innocent direct purchasers (the best antitrust enforcers in horizontal 
price-fixing conspiracies) to bring suit is absent—here, direct purchasers are conspiring 
                                                          
220
  Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d 193, 223 (4th Cir. 2002) (Gregory, J., dissenting) (“[T]here are 
mechanisms, primarily Rule 11, to deal with the abusive and unethical conduct of litigants and lawyers.”). 
221
  Dickson, 309 F.3d at 223 (Gregory, J., dissenting). 
222
  Id. (emphasis in the original). The dissent found troubling “the majority’s unhesitating unwillingness to cut off 
compensation to all injured consumers based on hypothetical abuses of liberal pleading rules.”  Id. (emphasis in the 
original). 
223
  Supra note 69, 71 and accompanying text. 
224
  The “first nonconspirator” rule is the “correct reading of Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick.”  It maximizes 
deterrence by giving the right to sue to the plaintiff with the most incentive to sue.”  Dickson, 309 F.3d at 222 
(Gregory, J., dissenting). 
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intermediaries that already lack incentive to bring suit.  Second, duplicative recovery, to the 
extent it remains possible by a coconspirator’s defection, may be avoided through two methods: 
joinder of conspiring intermediaries as defendants to the suit
225
 or a requirement that any 
coconspirator’s involvement be “truly complete.”226  Third, apportionment at multiple links in 
the distribution chain is not needed, as only the first nonconspirator would have standing to sue.  
Finally, complex pass-through calculations, and in particular, elasticity measurements, may be 
avoided using alternative econometric techniques,
227
 or by awarding the first nonconspirator the 
entire overcharge paid by direct purchasers.
228
 
V. Conclusion 
Courts have widely adopted the “coconspirator exception” to the Illinois Brick, which 
traditionally applies where an upstream producer and its direct purchasers enter into a vertical 
conspiracy to fix retail-level prices.  Under the exception, courts grant indirect purchasers 
standing because direct purchasers—usually the best antitrust enforcers—are conspiring 
intermediaries that lack incentive to bring suit.  Denying indirect purchasers standing in such 
situations would therefore leave the antitrust laws with no viable enforcer:  the first indirect 
purchaser, then, becomes the best antitrust enforcer.  This principle is consistent with, and in-fact 
bolstered by, Illinois Brick, as the concerns that are associated with indirect-purchaser 
standing—duplicative recovery, apportionment along the chain of distribution, and complex 
pass-through calculations—are absent. 
                                                          
225
  Supra note 73 and accompanying text;   Dickson, 309 F.3d at 222 (Gregory, J., dissenting) (“As for any lingering 
doubt over whether the conspiring intermediary is the best plaintiff, or concern regarding multiple recovery, the case 
law has rightly recognized the importance of joining the intermediary in the suit . . . .”). 
226
  Supra note 149 and accompanying text. 
227
  Supra notes 198–203 and accompanying text. 
228
  Supra notes 204–209 and accompanying text. 
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In addition to price fixing at the retail-level, economic literature indicates that vertical 
conspiracies are able to exploit antitrust laws in a second way.  Pursuant to an agreement with 
conspiring direct purchasers, upstream suppliers may charge supra-competitive prices, resulting 
in an initial overcharge to direct purchasers.  Direct purchasers, then, would pass-on the 
overcharge to indirect purchasers, while also receiving “side-payments” from the supplier—the 
mechanism by which monopoly profits are shared—as compensation for their complicity in the 
scheme. 
The Ninth Circuit and the Fourth Circuit, however, have limited the reach of the 
coconspirator exception, granting indirect purchasers standing where vertical conspiracies are 
engaged in traditional, retail-level price fixing (fixing of the “price paid”), but not where such 
conspiracies fix upstream prices and operate pursuant to the side-payment scheme described 
above.  In adopting the “price paid” rule, these courts have reasoned that extension of the 
coconspirator exception would 1) transgress the Supreme Court’s warning against creating new 
exceptions to the direct purchaser rule; 2) require pass-through theories that are barred by Illinois 
Brick; and 3) allow plaintiffs to avoid Illinois Brick through artful pleading.  The Ninth Circuit 
and Fourth Circuit would bar indirect purchasers from maintaining a cause of action, even where 
they could successfully plead and prove the existence of a vertical conspiracy that fixes upstream 
prices with the intent to extract monopoly profits from indirect purchasers.  Future conspirators, 
as a result, have been handed a roadmap to avoid antitrust laws. 
The justifications for the “price paid” rule, moreover, are derived from an incorrect 
reading of Illinois Brick.  First, the Supreme Court did not create a blanket ban on all exceptions 
to the direct purchaser rule: the Court only prohibited market-based exceptions, not exceptions 
tailored to address new kinds of conspiracies that were outside the contemplation of Illinois 
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Brick.   Second, Illinois Brick should not be interpreted to bar all indirect purchaser claims 
involving pass-through theories, but only those that also involve duplicative recovery and 
complex calculations along an entire chain of distribution.  And, even if Illinois Brick were a bar, 
pass-through calculations may be avoided through the use of alternative econometric techniques 
or by awarding indirect purchasers the entire upstream overcharge.  Finally, artful pleading is 
unlikely under the heightened pleading standards created by Twombly, and Rule 11 sanctions act 
as a deterrent for plaintiffs seeking to abuse pleading rules. 
The correct approach to antitrust standing is found in the Third Circuit and the Seventh 
Circuit.  The “first nonconspirator” rule, which grants standing to the first purchaser from outside 
the conspiracy, increases the efficacy of antitrust enforcement by elevating indirect purchasers 
where the preferred antitrust enforcers, direct purchasers, have conspired to generate the antitrust 
harm.  This approach deters all vertical conspiracies that exploit downstream consumers, not just 
those that effectuate harm by fixing retail-level prices.  Courts, as a result, should adopt flexible 
approaches to antitrust standing by viewing Illinois Brick’s concerns as a reflection of the 
Supreme Court’s overall intent to incentivize the best antitrust enforcers, not as mechanical 
prohibitions against indirect purchaser standing. 
 
